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COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY: EXEMPT PROPERTY AS THE SUBJECT
OF A PREFERENCE OR FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
It is the policy of the Bankruptcy Act that the bankrupt retain
some property from his estate to aid him in recovering from his
financial embarrassment.' A court of bankruptcy looks to the law
of the state of which the bankrupt is a resident to determine what
property is exempt, and allows the bankrupt to retain the same
property that he could reserve were his property subject to levy of
execution under the law of that state.2 The bankrupt asserts his
claim to exempt property in schedule 5 of the petition in bank-
ruptcy.3 Claimed exempt property does not become such merely
upon claim, for such claim is subject to examination, determination
and allowance in bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee has the right
to take and hold possession of the property so claimed until it is
released to the bankrupt as exempt. 4 A debtor's right to claim prop-
erty as exempt is a privilege which he can waive either expressly
or by implication. 5 In a large number of cases, waiver arises from
the fact that the debtor failed to claim the exemption at the proper
time.6
In Wisconsin, property which is exempt from execution is
specified by statute: wearing apparel,7 provisions," income,9 life in-
surance,10 and homesteads" are included. The homestead exemption
is based on the Wisconsin Constitution1 2 and is defined by statute .
3
A resident owner of real property may claim the exemption in his
dwelling and its appurtenances whether his interest in it is in fee,'
4
less than a fee, or an equity in mortgaged property.'5 The law re-
garding homesteads in Wisconsin is to be liberally construed, 6
thus while actual physical occupancy has been held to be unneces-
sary, some use or occupancy is required.' 7 Furthermore, while
1 Bankruptcy Act §6, 52 Stat. 847, 11 U.S.C. §24 (1938).
2 3 REMiNGTow, BANKRUPTCY §1280 (5th ed. 1957).
3Id. §1311.
4 CoLLIe, BANKRUPTCY §6.06 (14th ed. 1960).
5 6 Am. Ja. Bankruptcy §§128, 129 (1950).6 Annot., 82 A.L.R. 648 (1933).
7 WIS. STAT. §272.18(5) (1961).
s Wis. STAT. §272.18(7) (1961).
9 Wis. STAT. §272.18(15) (1961).
10 WIs. STAT. §272.18(19). (1961).
'- Wis. SrAT. §27220 (1961).
12 WIS. CoNsT. art. 1, §17: "The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary
comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reason-
able amount of property from any debt or liability hereafter contracted."
'3 WIs. STAT. §990.01(14) (1961).
14 Beranek v. Beranek, 113 Wis. 272, 89 N.W. 146 (1902).
'5 Northwestern Security Co. v. Nelson, 191 Wis. 580, 211 N.W. 798 (1927).
1 6 Jarvais v. Moe, 38 Wis. 440 (1875).
17 Scofield v. Hopkins, 61 Wis. 370, 21 N.W. 259 (1884); cf. In re Mayer, 108
Fed. 499, 6 Am. Bankr. R. 117 (1901).
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temporary removal will not destroy the homestead, something more
overt than a mere hope or intention to return is necessary in order
to claim the exemption.'"
As to life insurance policies, a debtor may claim the cash sur-
render value of any policy on his own life which names another
person as beneficiary, unless he transfers it with the intent to de-
fraud creditors. 19
A representative sampling of Wisconsin cases will indicate how
these rules are applied. In a garnishment proceeding by a mortgagee
against the president of a bank, one Fowler, to whom homestead
property had been conveyed subject to the mortgage in order to
secure a sum due to the transferee bank, the court held that the
property conveyed to Fowler was exempt and could not be reached
to satisfy plaintiff's judgment, stating:
. ..it is impossible to hold that the disposition thus made
would render the transaction void, even if colorable, or if it
amounted in effect to a voluntary assignment for the benefit
of creditors. They (the debtors) had a right to sell and convey
their homestead in any way or for any purpose they saw fit.
It cannot be predicated of a sale and conveyance or other
disposition of a homestead that it is a fraud, and void as
against creditors.20
In a state receivership proceeding in which the receiver at-
tempted to recover four lots conveyed by the debtor to his wife
without consideration and with the intent to place them beyond
the reach of creditors, the receiver was allowed to recover all but
one quarter acre; the court stating that "the creditors could not sell
the homestead had the title remained in the insolvent debtor. The
fact title has passed to the wife puts them in no better situation
with regard to the homestead."' '1
In another case, a bank which held four insurance policies as
security for a loan completely exhausting their cash surrender
values, sued the estate to which the policies were originally payable
as beneficiary to collect its claim. The policies had an aggregate
face value of $70,000.00. The deceased had substituted his wife and
daughter as beneficiaries three months before he committed sui-
cide. The bank contended that the decedent was insolvent at the
time he changed the beneficiary, and that such change constituted
a conveyance within the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The
court held that the change of beneficiary did not constitute a fraudu-
18 1936 Wis. L. REv. 121.
19 First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v. Roehling, 224 Wis. 316, 269
N.W. 677 (1936).
20 Bank of Commerce v. Fowler, 93 Wis. 241, 67 N.W. 423 (1896).
21Dreutzer v. Bell, 11 Wis. 119 (1860).
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lent conveyance because the policies had no cash surrender values
at the time the transfer was made.2
In an action by a debtor to replevy books seized by the sheriff
on execution, which books had been transferred one year earlier
to the debtor's two children without consideration, the court
stated:
. . . the fact that the transfer was without consideration
would be deemed a strong, if not conclusive, badge of fraud.
But in the case of exempt property which the creditor has
no right in law to subject to the payment of his (the debtor's)
debts, the rule is otherwise. . . .The true test is, was the
• ..gift valid when made? If the ownership and title then
passes absolutely from the debtor, so that he cannot after-
wards have or claim any benefit from it, the transfer is un-
impeachable on the part of creditors.
23
When decisions embodying policies like these are applied in
bankruptcy proceedings to determine what is exempt property, it
is obvious that the property in question is considered exempt in
almost any event. These decisions are also applied in suits where
the trustee in bankruptcy is attempting to recover for the benefit
of the estate, property which would have been claimed as exempt
if it had not been transferred. The theory of recovery in cases of
this nature is that such property has been fraudulently conveyed
or that the transfer constituted a preference. Such decisions operate
to bar the trustee's recovery in these situations. For example, in an
early case a debtor mortgaged exempt property as security for a
pre-existing debt; the mortgagee had reason to believe that the
debtor was insolvent at the time. A few days later the debtor filed
his petition in bankruptcy. The trustee attempted to recover the
property from the mortgagee, but failed because under state law
the property transferred was exempt. Thus it was beyond the reach
of creditors and outside of the trustee's grasp.
In a more recent federal decision, a trustee was held unable to
recover any portion of three lots transferred without consideration
to the bankrupt's son to avoid execution on a personal injury judg-
ment against the bankrupt. The basis of the decision was that the
property was the homestead of the bankrupt and "a conveyance of
exempt property by an insolvent debtor is not fraudulent as to
creditors. The debtors at no time waived or abandoned their home-
stead exemptions.125
22 First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v. Roehling, supra note 19.
23 Carhart v. Harshaw, 45 Wis. 340, 346 (1878).
24 Schlitz v. Schatz, 21 Fed. Cas. 699 (No. 12,459) (D. Wis. 1870). The term
"transferee" was used in the original Bankruptcy Act, but was later changed
to "trustee." The content of the sections was substantially the same.
25 MIcGhee v. Leitner, 41 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Wis. 1941).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
From an analytical standpoint, the first cases outlined above
demonstrate the need to make a prior determination as to what
property is exempt under state law. Wisconsin decisions on this
issue have held, as has been manifested, that a creditor could not
object to a debtor's transfer of exempt property in an effort to avoid
levy of execution, because the creditor had no interest in such property.
The second phase of the problem of transferring exempt proper-
ty arises when the trustee, who is not limited to the rights of indi-
vidual creditors in the use of his "weapons," sets aside a colorable
transaction under the Bankruptcy Act as a voidable preference or a
fraudulent conveyance. The issue then presented is whether the
bankruptcy court should allow the bankrupt to claim his exemp-
tions out of the property so recovered. Originally, there existed a
wide split of authority on the issue; some courts allowed the bank-
rupt to claim the exemptions, while others held that he forfeited
his exemption rights in making the fraudulent conveyance or void-
able preference. Wisconsin decisions can be found to support both
positions; however, the former view has been adopted. An examina-
tion of two Wisconsin cases will serve to disclose the varying ra-
tionalizations of the courts.
In one case, a husband and wife gave a deed to their daughter in
return for a promise of care and support; the husband and wife
remained in possession of the property deeded. The husband then
filed in bankruptcy, and the trustee brought an action to have the
conveyance declared void. He then sold the property to the plain-
tiff, who sued to eject the husband and wife. The defendants pre-
vailed, the court holding that property fraudulently conveyed is
nevertheless considered as belonging to the bankrupt. Thus the
judgment in the action to set aside the deed was not binding against
the husband and wife because they were not parties to the suit and
were not given a chance to claim their homestead exemption. Fur-
ther, because the property was still the bankrupt's, the trustee had
no right to it, for under the Bankruptcy Act he acquired title to
non-exempt property only.28
In another case, it was decided that because the articles in ques-
tion were sold by the bankrupt to one Hanlon before the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy, the bankrupt was not entitled to them
whether exempt or not. The sale was found to be made in order to
hinder and delay creditors, and thus was void except as to the bank-
rupt:
The evidence clearly satisfies me that the bankrupt had
parted with all his interest in them before the commence-
ment of these proceedings, and that they are not now, and
26McFarland v. Goodman, 16 Fed. Cas. 90 (No. 8,789) (E.D. Wis. 1874).
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were not then, his property, but as between Him and Han-
lon, they belonged to Hanlon; that the creditors alone can
impeach the title of Hanlon for the fraud.2 7
In 1938 section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act was amended to read:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the
exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United
States or by the State laws in force at the time of the filing
of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months
than in any other State: Provided, however, That no such al-
lowance shall be made out of the property which a bankrupt
transferred or concealed and which is recovered or the trans-
fer of which is avoided under this Act for the benefit of the
estate, except that, where the voided transfer was made by
way of security only and the property recovered is in excess
of the amount secured thereby, such allowance may be made
out of such excess. 28
The crucial words in the proviso are "under this Act." These words
clearly indicate that Congress intended the trustee to employ the
weapons of the Bankruptcy Act itself to avoid a colorable transfer.
In other words, the trustee should use section 60 if the transfer
constitutes a preference. The power of the trustee in bankruptcy
under section 60 is neither derived from an existing creditor,2 9 nor
dependent upon state law except as to the question of perfecting
a security interest in the article involved. 0 Section 67(d) (3) should
be utilized if the fraudent transfer is made within one year prior
to the filing of the petition.3 2 The trustee's power under this section
is similarly non-derivative and independent of the construction of
the fraudulent conveyance law of any state. This is due to the fact
that the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was in effect enacted
as part of the Bankruptcy Act under section 67(2).32 The state law
of fraudulent conveyances may continue to hamper the trustee in
his attempts to use section 70(c) to recover the property for the
estate, for that section gives him the powers of a hypothetical lien
creditor who could obtain a lien under state law at the date of the
bankruptcy.3 3 Since under Wisconsin law a creditor cannot obtain
a lien on exempt property fraudulently conveyed, the trustee can-
not. The same problem exists under section 70(e).
It is imperative that the proviso of section 6 be interpreted as
expressing the intention that federal law supercede state law on
the issue of the right to claim exemptions out of property recovered
2
7In re Graham, 10 Fed. Cas. 914 (No. 5,660) (W.D. Wis. 1871).2 8 Bankruptcy Act §6, 52 Stat. 847, 11 U.S.C. §24 (1938).
29 Bankruptcy Act §60(3), 52 Stat. 869, 11 U.S.C. §96 (1938).
30 Bankruptcy Act §60(2), 52 Stat. 869, 11 U.S.C. §96 (1938).
31 Bankruptcy Act §67(d) (2), 66 Stat. 427, 11 U.S.C. §107 (1952).2Cf. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Wis. STAT. ch. 242 (1961).
3 Bankruptcy Act §70(c), 66 Stat. 429, 11 U.S.C. §110 (1952).
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for the estate in order to effecuate the Congressional purpose in
enacting it. A statement of this purpose is found in the House
Hearings report:
The only important new provision is that, when the bankrupt
has transferred his property, or by way of fraudulent con-
veyance, and the trustee discovers this fact, the bankrupt
cannot impede the trustee's recovery by claiming exemptions
out of the property so recovered and which he, himself, had
transferred before bankruptcy. It is merely that it is inequit-
able that a bankrupt, who has transferred his property, shall
benefit by the action of the trustee in setting aside that trans-
fer, and take away the fruits of the trustee's labor.
34
In the opinion of Collier, the acknowledged authority on bank-
ruptcy law, the amended section 6 stilled the conflict noted above:
It is clear . . . that wherever the trustee recovers property
transferred or concealed by the bankrupt, or where any trans-
fer can be avoided under the terms of the Act, the bankrupt
will not be allowed to amend his schedules and claim ex-
emptions out of that particular property save in the situation
within the "except" clause.35
Collier's theory as to the effect of the proviso has been recog-
nized by the several courts in cases decided since 1938. Gardner v.
Johnson36 involved a woman who had acquired a valid homestead
under California law and who thereupon conveyed it to her daugh-
ter three years before her bankruptcy petition was filed. She failed
to claim the property as exempt in the schedules. When she later
attempted to do so the court found that she had waived and
abandoned any claim to the homestead exemption by her failure
to schedule it. This result was contrary to California decisions
holding that a homestead cannot be lost or abandoned by a con-
veyance made for the purpose of avoiding creditors, and that home-
stead property cannot be the subject of a fraudulent conveyance
since creditors have no claim thereto. The court stated that to hold
other than it did "make(s) the bankrupt the beneficiary of the trus-
tee's suit to set aside her fraudulent conveyance."
37
The same result was reached in In re Grisanti,38 a case which in-
volved a claim of a $1,000.00 homestead exemption under the law
of Kentucky in property which the bankrupt had mortgaged to his
son. The mortgage was avoided and the property sold. The court
recognized the conflicting decisions on the issue of whether the
3
'Mr. Watson B. Adair, member National Bankruptcy Congress, H. R. REP.
No. 6,439, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937).
35 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §6.11 (14th ed. 1960).
36 195 F. 2d 717 (9th Cir. 1952).
3 Id. at 719.
38 58 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ky. 1945).
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exemption should be allowed the bankrupt out of the proceeds of
sale and stated:
It was Congress' intention in enacting this proviso . . . to
clear up this conflict by making the matter uniform through-
out the country and not to permit an allowance to be made
out of property which is recovered after a preference or
fraudulent transfer . . . even if allowed under Kentucky de-
cisions.39 [Emphasis added.]
In Branchfield et al. v. McCulley et al. 40 the bankrupt McCulley
and his wife deeded their real property to one Allard, Mrs. McCul-
ley's minor son. The alleged consideration was the cancellation of
a pre-existing debt of $7235 owed to Allard and represented by a
note signed by the McCully's. The trustee in bankruptcy con-
tended that the sole purpose of the deed was to hinder and defraud
the defendant's creditors, and that Allard had not in fact given the
defendants money on the date the note was executed. Defendant's
claimed the realty as their homestead and contended that they had
been solvent on the date of the transfer of the deed. The court held
that the McCulleys had barred themselves from the exemption
which they later sought by signing and recording the fraudulent
deed by virtue of the proviso of section 6.4 1
In re Rogers42 involved a bankrupt who orally assigned a life
insurance policy to his wife two years before filing his petition in
bankruptcy. When he filed it, he failed to claim the cash surrender
value of the policy as exempt. The referee found no assignment
and ordered the bankrupt to pay him the cash surrender value
under section 70(a), or to turn the policy over to the trustee. The
bankrupt and his wife filed a petition to review. Two years and four
months later, the bankrupt moved to amend his schedules so as to
include the policy as exempt for himself. The court denied this
motion stating:
The bankrupt did not list the policy deliberately, and as-
signed with the intent to prevent the trustee and his creditors
from knowing. The policy is the bankrupt's and he is not en-
titled to claim the exemption.
There is no equity in allowing a bankrupt to deliberately fail
to mention the insurance policy in the schedule, and con-
tend that he had assigned it to his wife.. . then amend only
after an adverse decision by the Referee (in the turn-over
proceedings) .43
These cases evidence the disfavor with which the majority of courts
now view transfers of exempt property by persons facing imminent
39 Id. at 649.
40192 Ore. 270, 231 P. 2d 791 (1951).
41 Id., 231 P. 2d at 788.
4245 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. N.Y. 1942).
43 Id. at 300.
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bankruptcy. In order to appreciate this viewpoint it is helpful to ex-
amine the probable purposes underlying the transfer of exempt property
by a debtor. If the debtor retains the exempt property and claims the
exemptions, the property or a part thereof will be adjudged to be his.
If he transfers the property to a creditor in payment of a debt, that
creditor is preferred. If the debtor conveys it to another for cash, the
cash becomes part of his estate and gives him no personal advantage.
If he transfers it to a member of his family for no consideration, it is
a fraudulent conveyance. Thus it appears that to transfer exempt money
is actually useless. Having eliminated any result which would be ad-
vantageous to the debtor, what motive could therefore prompt the
transfer by him of exempt property other than the purpose to some-
how defraud his creditors on the mistaken assumption that the property
will be safer in the hands of another in the event of his bankruptcy.
Pressure exerted by a coercing creditor may be another motivating
factor forcing the transfer of property which otherwise would be be-
yond the creditor's reach. But as this also brings about an undesirable
result, neither reason appears to serve the best interests of debtors or
creditors.
The case of Rutledge v. Johnson" is an example of the minority view
on the issue. In that case the trustee sued to recover property trans-
ferred for an antecedent debt within four months preceding bankruptcy.
At the time of the transfer the property was the bankrupt's homestead.
He claimed no exemption in the bankruptcy schedule. The trial court
found that all the requirements of a voidable preference were present,
but held that it was not voidable because the property transferred was
exempt under Oklahoma law. The trustee contended on appeal that the
effect of the trial court's judgment was to permit the transferee of the
property to claim the exemption, the right to which is personal to the
bankrupt and which he alone may claim. The court found that the ad-
ministrative directions (claiming property as exempt in the schedules)
that confine exemption rights to those claimed and set apart upon ad-
judication apply only to exempt property of which the bankrupt was
seized at the time of filing.
While there is much to be said for confining exemption rights
to those claimed and set apart upon adjudication, it seems more
in consonance with the spirit and purpose of the exemption laws
as they are honored in bankruptcy, to hold these administrative
directions applicable only to exempt property of which the bank-
rupt was seized at the time of the filing of bankruptcy. For to
hold otherwise would afford creditors a right in exempt property
prior to bankruptcy which the law does not give them at the time
of the filing or after adjudication. 5




It is the opinion of this writer that this decision completely disre-
gards the intention of Congress in enacting the proviso of section 6.
The court's decision in Rutledge is pronounced as if state law alone is
determinative of the issue. This, as has been demonstrated previously,
is not the correct position. The court speaks of giving creditors a right
in exempt property. This is of course repugnant to the decisions of
many state courts concerning exempt property. It was the purpose of
Congress to give the trustee, not individual creditors, an interest in
exempt property fraudulently or preferentially transferred.
The "administrative directions" in fact do apply only to property
held by the bankrupt at the time of filing, for the Act provides that all
the bankrupt's property must be turned over to the trustee although
the title to exempt property does not pass to him; and thus only the
property claimed as exempt by the bankrupt at the time of filing can
be set apart by the trustee as exempt.46 If, as the Rutledge decision
suggests, the trustee is barred under state law from recovering property
transferred before the time of filing because it would be exempt if the
bankrupt had kept it and claimed the exemption, then the result would
be to allow the transferee of the property to stand in the shoes of the
bankrupt by claiming the exemption for him in an action by the trustee
against the transferee. Consequently, the time of adjudication and
specification of exempt property "relates back" to the time the fraudu-
lent transfer was made.
There is a strong dissenting opinion in Rutledge written by Judge
Breitenstein which touches the practical heart of the problem:
A decision upholding the transfer runs contrary to the rules,
recognized by the majority, that the status and rights of the
bankrupt, the creditors and the trustee are determined as of the
date of filing and that any exemption must be claimed by the
bankrupt. Failure to follow these rules favors an aggressive
creditor and deprives a bankrupt of the means of rehabilitation
which the exemption laws are intended to afford. The fact that
the debtor could make the transfer after bankruptcy is, to me, no
answer. Before bankruptcy, an honest man strives to prevent
the impending disaster. After bankruptcy he attempts to save
what he can from the wreck. These simple considerations justify
the policy of fixing rights as of the date of bankruptcy and of
giving to the bankrupt not to a transferee, the right to claim an
exemption.47
In summary, it is the opinion of the writer that the majority view
which denies to a bankrupt the right to claim an exemption out of prop-
erty fraudulently or preferentially transferred is the better reasoned
position and that it better accomplishes the purpose of thebankruptcy
act as a whole. MARGARET M. HuFF
46 COLLIER Op. Cit. supra note 4.
47 Note 44 sapra, at 883.
